TVIB News News and Updates

MSIB – Acceptable U.S. Ballast Water Management Methods vs. BWM Convention Methods

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06/30/2017

The U.S. Coast published MSCI No.: 007-17 Acceptable U.S. Ballast Water Management Methods vs. BWM Convention Methods.

The purpose of this bulletin is to remind masters, owners/operators, agents and persons-in-charge of vessels that the United States is not signatory to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediment (BWM Convention) and that vessels discharging ballast water (BW) into the waters of the U.S. must comply with the requirements of 33 CFR 151 Subparts C and D.

Non-recreational vessels, U.S. and foreign, that are equipped with ballast tanks are required to comply with the U.S. ballast water regulations provided in Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 151 Subparts C & D when operating in the waters of the United States, except as expressly provided in 33 CFR 151.2015 & 151.2020.

Click here to download MSIB 007-17 in full.

USCG Blog – Cyber Security and the Safety Management System

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06/30/2017

A recent post on the USCG Blog for Maritime Professionals announced the IMO resolution on cyber risk management that was approved at the 98th session of the Maritime Safety Committee.

Excerpt “The resolution affirms that approved safety management systems should take cyber risk management into account in accordance with the objectives and requirements of the International Safety Management Code. Drawing upon the recommendations published in MSC.1/Circ.1526 Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, the resolution also reaffirmed that existing risk management practices should be used to address the operational risks associated with the growing dependence on cyber enabled systems. Through the resolution, IMO member states are encouraged to ensure cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021. The Coast Guard will continue to work with industry partners to develop a clear and achievable path towards compliance in order to foster a resilient risk management approach towards cyber risks throughout the Marine Transportation System.”

While this resolution is specific to those operating under the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, other should take note as the trend is quickly spreading. Those participating in the Oil Companies International Marine Forum’s (OCIMF) Tanker Management and Self Assessment, Third Edition 2017 (TMSA3) will note the addition of element 13 Maritime Security. Element 13 specifically references cyber security in 13.2.3.

Click here to read the USCG blog post on Cyber Risk Management.

 

NTSB Releases Reports from Recent Investigations Involving Towing Vessels

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The NTSB recently released reports from its investigations of two separate incidents involving towing vessels. What should be of interest to all is the indication in the probable cause of both that points to personnel training and effectiveness of the Safety Management System as either contributing or causal factors. Following are excerpts from the two separate reports:

M/V Peter F Gellatly
On August 1, 2015, at 2147 local time, the tank barge Double Skin 501 being pushed by the uninspected towing vessel Peter F Gellatly allided with International Matex Tank Terminals (IMTT) Bayonne Pier A in Bayonne, New Jersey, as the captain attempted to dock the tow at a nearby pier. Damage to the barge, pier, and an adjacent ship, the Isola Bianca, totaled an estimated $2.7 million. The allision also damaged pipelines on the pier, resulting in the discharge of 630 gallons of no. 6 fuel oil into the waterway.1 There were no injuries.

  • Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision of the Peter F Gellatly tow with IMTT Bayonne Pier A was the captain and the engineer’s poor communication, their inadequate assessment of the hazardous condition posed by the starboard engine control malfunction, and the captain’s decision to continue operations without ensuring that the malfunction had been adequately corrected. Contributing to the accident was the crew’s unfamiliarity with the provisions of the company’s safety management system that addressed actions in response to hazardous conditions.
  • Click here to read the full report.

M/V Jaxon Aaron
About 1140 local time on August 13, 2016, a fire erupted in the engine room on board the uninspected towing vessel Jaxon Aaron while it was pushing a flotilla of 16 barges upbound on the Lower Mississippi River near mile marker (mm) 770, approximately 24 miles north of Memphis, Tennessee. The fire spread from the engine room into the accommodation area and wheelhouse, causing an estimated $10.2 million in damage to the interior spaces. All nine crewmembers evacuated the vessel safely to the barge flotilla. No pollution was reported.

  • Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the fire aboard the towing vessel Jaxon Aaron was the failure of the power assembly components on the port main diesel engine’s no. 15 cylinder. Contributing to the extent of the fire damage was the substantial use of combustible materials in the interior spaces and the chief engineer’s unfamiliarity with the firefighting equipment.
  • Click here to read the full report.